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Abstract
For years, the US Intelligence Community has worked to maintain the thin and
often wavering line between civil liberty and national security in its attempts to protect
the American people while simultaneously preserving their constitutional rights.
However, this line has often shifted with the course of American history, including events
such as the Alien and Sedition Acts, the establishment of the Church Committee, and the
publication of the NSA’s data collection program. One of the most significant of these
factors was the passage and eventual amendment of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act, which opened the door to later constitutional controversies. In the midst of this everchanging national landscape, how is the US Intelligence Community to strike a balance
between protecting the American people and ensuring their civil freedoms?
The Intelligence Community must remember that it has a responsibility to protect
both the American people and their constitutional freedoms. The Intelligence Community
faces the unique challenge of reconciling the freedom of the American people to live
safely and the freedom of the US government, embodied by the executive branch, to lead.
In recent history, it has done a remarkable job of instituting measures of oversight and
enacting greater controls on itself as part of the executive branch to avoid the
unconstitutional missteps it has taken in the past. Intelligence agencies in the present and
future must continue to prioritize not only on the safety of the United States and its
people but also on the maintenance of the liberties guaranteed to them under the US
Constitution.
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Civil Liberty and National Security: The Implications of the Debate for the
United States Intelligence Community
For nearly as long as the United States has existed as a nation, there has been a
perpetual struggle between the rights of the government and the rights of its citizens; in
fact, the United States was itself the product of such tension. For decades, politicians,
legislators, presidents, and the American public have all striven to find a balance between
the guarantee of liberty for individual American citizens and the pressing demands of
national security, which often appear in direct opposition. Over the centuries both
pressure to cede greater control over the lives of its citizens to the federal government
and countervailing pressure to reclaim individual civil liberty from government reach
have created fluctuations in national power reflected in both federal legislative and
executive action. The current state of domestic security concerns has arisen as a product
of such events and corresponding actions on the part of both the American government
and the American people, and the future condition of the intelligence and civil liberty
balance will likewise reflect ongoing attitudes and events. Members of the Intelligence
Community must consider the past, present, and future implications of national security
measures in the light of civil liberty concerns in order to best protect American citizens
both tangibly and intangibly.
The crucial distinction to make in the debate of civil liberty and national security
is one of perspective, particularly regarding the primacy of ideas. Which is the baseline
for determination of the country’s atmosphere, liberty or security? Put another way, is
civil liberty the foundation that is occasionally surrendered in the name of national
security, or is national security the base state that is temporarily surrendered in the name
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of civil liberty? The entire premise of the debate is comprised within this one central
question, which Ben Franklin once answered succinctly: “Those who would give up
essential Liberty to purchase little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety.”1
This oft-quoted maxim has been historically utilized by those adamant against
government encroachment into American freedoms as guaranteed by the founding
documents; however, according to Benjamin Wittes with the Brookings Institute, the
quote’s original significance was to an opposite effect.2
Wittes recounts the history of the phrase as an influential Pennsylvania family
attempting to avoid taxes on their property that would be used for defense purposes by
encouraging the governor to overturn the legislature’s attempts to enforce taxation.3
Finally, the family offered a compromise; they would contribute to the town’s defense
voluntarily in exchange for a cessation of attempted tax legislation, thereby undermining
the authority of the legislature in the area of defense.4 Franklin’s quote regarding liberty
and security did not mean surrendering freedom to the government in exchange for
government protection but dichotomously sacrificing the freedom of the government to
act in defense of its citizens in exchange for a momentary influx of funds which could
immediately secure that defense.5

Robert Siegel, “Ben Franklin’s Famous ‘Liberty, Safety’ Quote Lost Its Context In 21 st
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This view exposes the true heart of the civil liberty versus national security
debate: despite countless other opinions and perspectives on the topic or related subjects,
notwithstanding the passionate and intense rhetoric that mires the discussion in emotion,
the center of the entire quagmire boils down to one primary question: whose liberty is
superior? Does the state’s liberty to govern,6 under which defense is a subcategory further
delineated to national security, supersede an individual citizen’s liberty to exist and act
freely independently within his country, or vice versa? Abraham Lincoln asked a similar
question when he said, “Must a government, of necessity, be too strong for the liberties
of its own people, or too weak to maintain its own existence?”7 While this distinction
clarifies the true aim of the debate, it unfortunately fails to simplify the complications,
implications, or inevitable answer of the question. However, it does provide a proper
perspective from which to analyze the historical evidence for each side, beginning with a
summary of the circumstances, provisions, and results of each historical event from the
founding of the United States through the USA PATRIOT and FREEDOM Acts, and
their significance for the US Intelligence Community.
History
The document that established the American structure of government was the
United States Constitution, which famously begins:
We the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union,
establish Justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense,
promote the general welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and
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posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of
America.8
Even in its preamble, the dichotomous concepts of liberty and defense are not
only present but interestingly lacking their traditional juxtaposition. However, the content
of the document itself espouses a theme that runs forward through American history: the
idea of government power limited by the will of the people, in no area more significant
than that of military and intelligence matters. This concept entwines so thoroughly with
the very structure of American government, from federalism to checks and balances
between the branches of government, that it can hardly be understated. Above and
beyond every other sentiment expressed in the nation’s founding documents, a hesitation
regarding the concentration of power in the hands of a governmental system has always
reigned supreme. Stated outright in the Declaration of Independence, the authority and
liberty to govern are deliberately granted to the federal government first by the people—
“deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed”9— and then, in the Tenth
Amendment, by the states—“The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or
to the people.”10
While the Constitution establishes the underlying foundation for the guarantee of
rights to American citizens, liberties are directly exposited in the Bill of Rights. The ten
amendments include various protected rights intended to secure freedom for the governed
and dictate a proper framework of government in view of the consistent theme of the
8
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delegation of power from the people to the government. Most relevant to the discussion
of civil liberty are the First and Fourth Amendments. The First Amendment incorporates
five key provisions: the freedoms of speech, petition, press, religion, and assembly.11 The
Fourth prevented the arbitrary person and property searches.12 The Tenth Amendment,
referenced above, reserves for the states those rights not explicitly given to the federal
government.13 The sum total of the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and
the Bill of Rights serves to provide the origin, foundation, and enumeration of the rights
guaranteed to American citizens which are, by most accounts, straightforward. However,
it would be less than a decade before the Constitution and the Bill of Rights faced their
first major challenge of application in the form of the Alien and Sedition Acts.
The Alien and Sedition Acts were enacted during the tension between France and
the United States and dated from the Fifth US Congress in 1798.14 Caught between
Britain and an increasingly turbulent France that threatened to pull the US into a war that
could condemn the newborn nation to an early grave, the United States sought
desperately for a path that would allow it to remain clear of the debris of a disintegrating
Europe.15 However, foreign policy struggles were not the only issues that faced the
United States; domestic squabbles between the Federalists, who leaned towards support
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of Britain, and the Republicans, who related more consistently to the French cause,
created serious complications for Congress and the nation as these party confrontations
often used legislation and other matters of national importance as pawns for their political
gamesmanship, with devastating consequences for civil liberties.16
Furious over implications that France had actors working on its behalf within the
United States, a bitterly divided Congress enacted the Alien and Sedition Acts in an effort
to eradicate any perilous rhetoric that could propel the young country into the European
conflict.17 Comprised of four pieces of legislation, the Acts construed breaches of civil
liberty that most Americans today would find unconscionable.18 The first, the
Naturalization Act, was by far the least damaging to US freedoms, merely increasing the
time required for a resident alien to become a citizen from five to fourteen years and
requiring the registration of immigrants and aliens already in the United States within
respective time periods of two days and six months.19 However, this legislation only
arose following dissension in the Federalist ranks after the majority refused to endorse
the original measures proposed by the party’s firebrands, which included a halt on
immigration and a ban against the vote for immigrants who were not yet naturalized,
intended to cripple the Republicans who derived political support from Irish immigrants
sympathetic to Britain.20

16

Taylor, “The Alien and Sedition Acts,” 64-65.

17

Ibid., 66.

18

Ibid., 67.

19

Ibid., 68.

20

Ibid., 68.

10
The second part of the acts, the Alien Enemies Act, granted the president
authority to arrest and deport immigrants from enemy nations during time of war, a
statute never utilized during its originating context.21 This measure was one of the least
complicated of the Acts, passing both houses easily with approval from both Republicans
and Federalists.22
However, the luck of smooth legislation passage quickly ran out as the third
piece, the Alien Act, began in the Senate and quickly ran into opposition.23 The Alien Act
allowed the executive branch to order the deportation of any immigrant generically
deemed “‘dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States,’”24 without a trial or
even official charges brought against the individual.25 The chief opponents of this
legislation were Albert Gallatin, himself an immigrant and a Republican and
Representative Edward Livingstone, considered by many a Federalist turncoat.26 Gallatin
and Livingstone argued vehemently against the Alien Act, citing interestingly not
guaranteed liberties under the Bill of Rights, which may have been overturned based
upon the lack of citizenship of those affected, but instead using the 10th Amendment and
the Constitution to claim that powers of immigration were not given specifically to the
federal government and therefore were reserved to the states, rendering the Alien Act’s
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passage at the federal level unconstitutional and ineffectual.27 The Federalists in response
argued that such powers fell under the purview of the federal government in its
responsibility to defend American citizens, and this logic prevailed, leading to the
passage of the Act, which was nevertheless never put into effect by a hesitant John
Adams before its expiration in 1800.28
Despite the political battles, intense discussion, and overall ineffectuality of the
previous three acts, the fourth and final piece of the Alien and Sedition Acts would prove
to be the most constitutionally devastating and the most often applied of the group.29
Under the Sedition Act, “it became a federal crime to utter or publish ‘any false,
scandalous, and malicious writing or writings against the government of the United States
or the President of the United States, with intent to defame…or to bring them to contempt
or disrepute.’”30 To any modern reader, the violation of First Amendment freedoms by
this legislation is obvious; however, in its historical context, the Sedition Act led to
ultimate clarification of Bill of Rights protections where previous differentiation of
interpretations existed.31 The Federalists, with their British-influenced take on political
understanding, referenced William Blackstone’s view of the freedoms of speech and
press:
‘The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state; but this
consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and not in freedom
from censure for criminal matter when published… Thus the will of individuals is
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still left free, and only the abuse of this free-will is the object of legal
punishment.’32
Based upon this interpretation of freedom of speech and considering the absence
of any stated definition in either the Constitution or the Bill of Rights,33 the Sedition Act
was permissible and even progressive, given its deviation from British tradition in the
jurisdiction of juries as opposed to judges, the requirement of malicious intent, and the
permission of truth as defense.34 However, the Republican viewpoint on the proper
definition differed significantly, as Republican legislators used the Bill of Rights as a
foundation to argue against the imposition of British common law at the American
federal level, questioning the truth defense allowance and the resting of the burden of
proof upon the defense as opposed to the prosecution.35 Ultimately, the Republicans were
overridden, and the legislation became law, though designed to expire in 1801.36
Before it could do so, the Sedition Act was vigorously enforced by Federalist
congressmen, Cabinet members, and even Federalist newspapers desiring increased
profits as Republican papers were shut down by prosecutions and fines.37 A temporary
victory, the law allowed for the arrest of a Republican congressman critical of the
Federalist president and electoral gains in the House during the next election cycle.38
Instead of discouraging Republican-controlled or Republican-favoring papers to back
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down from critiquing Federalist actions, such organizations instead increased their
opposition.39 The ease of tension with France that followed shortly and the cessation of
bellicosity was likewise a great detriment to the party, which had hoped to use the
conflict as a platform to accomplish its goals.40 In the 1800 elections, Republicans gained
a majority in the House, an even stance in the Senate, and a presidential victory with the
election of Thomas Jefferson.41 The Republican rise to power signified the end of the
Federalist Party, which later descended to obscurity and oblivion.42
The constitutional violations of civil liberties constituted by the Alien and
Sedition Acts and the subsequent political defeat of the Federalist Party43 speak volumes
for the liberty and security debate. The events of the nation’s founding and the buildup to
a potential conflict with France both showcase a particular implication regarding the
sacrifice of either freedom or security for the sake of the other. The unfortunate historical
example of the Federalist Party demonstrates that in the face of pressing national security
concerns, issues regarding civil liberty maintain precedence.
Unfortunately, the US Intelligence Community has been slow to comprehend and
implement this lesson. In 2014, the United States became aware of a massive data
collection program that had unintentionally surveilled its own citizens.44 The public was
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outraged, calling the program a violation of American constitutional rights.45 However,
the collection program’s defenders argued that collection against US citizens had been
incidental, with the true intelligence targets being foreign nationals.46 Intelligence
collection against foreign nationals is not bound by the constitutional strictures that apply
to American citizens but instead falls under the jurisdiction of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978, which created the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to
regulate electronic surveillance on behalf of the Intelligence Community.47
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act was a product of factors set in motion
long before its passage in 1978.48 American civil liberties had been under siege from both
the executive and legislative branch, often via the Intelligence Community, for decades.
“…In 1940… Roosevelt’s order narrowed the use of wiretapping to listening in on
espionage by foreign agents… President Harry S. Truman, presiding over the beginning
of the Cold War, approved the tapping of phones in cases involving ‘domestic
security.’”49 These directives, among others, began the slippery slope of compromising
the individual freedoms of American citizens in the name of national security,
particularly as the Cold War grew in intensity and bitterness.
targeted-far-outnumber-the-foreigners-who-are/2014/07/05/8139adf8-045a-11e4-85724b1b969b6322_story.html?tid=a_inl&utm_term=.375057730169
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The turbulent political arena of the early 1970s spawned trouble for the
Intelligence Community.50 Johnson writes, “The setting in Washington at the time
included a resurgent Congress, which had resolved to halt the erosion of its powers at the
hands of what Arthur Schlesinger famously described as the “imperial presidency,”
symbolized most conspicuously by the events known in shorthand as “Watergate” and
“Vietnam.””51 Many ambitious policymakers saw a sensational exposé on government
overreach in the civil liberties arena as the ticket to power. One such politician was Idaho
Senator Frank Church, who hoped to ride the wave of fame stemming from the
committee that bore his name to a presidency.52
The recent scandals faced by the legislative branches were deeply interconnected
with those of the Intelligence Community. For decades, the Intelligence Community had
operated with virtually no oversight, briefing only the president on ongoing intelligence
activities, and that only when absolutely necessary.53 Against this backdrop, Senator
Church led a congressional inquiry into executive overreach in national security.54 The
Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence
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Activities, or the Church Committee,55 attempted to rein in the Intelligence Community,
particularly the CIA, to which he referred as “‘a rogue elephant on a rampage.’”56
The Church Committee in 1975 began to unearth programs and actions conducted
by the Intelligence Community that constituted potentially serious legal violations.57 The
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) remained the primary focus of the Committee’s
inquiry after the revelation of several incriminating programs. Operation CHAOS, the
agency’s surveillance and collection against anti-war protestors during Vietnam, included
Project HT Lingual, the opening of first-class mail in violation of the First Amendment
rights and federal law.58 These operations, among others, caused an uproar when
information regarding its illegality was leaked to the New York Times.59 The Huston Plan,
enacted under President Nixon, granted the Intelligence Community the ability to violate
the First and Fourth Amendment rights of student groups on university campuses.60 The
president believed these groups or at least a percentage of their members were in
collusion with the Communist Party in an attempt to overthrow the United States.61
However, by far the most damaging was a leak that occurred after Director of Central
Federal Judicial Center, “Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and Court of Review, 1978present,” n.d., retrieved from https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/foreign-intelligence-surveillance-courtand-court-review-1978-present
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Intelligence James R. Schlesinger ordered the compilation of a list of all constitutional
violations carried out by the agency in an attempt to solve many of the CIA’s problems
in-house.62 This list, known as “the family jewels,”63 caused the CIA significant
embarrassment when it leaked to the New York Times and was published for the world to
read.64
However, the CIA was not the only agency to lose face during the Church
Committee’s investigation. Church Committee lawyers also discovered a secret Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) counterintelligence program, Cointelpro, which “had
harassed civil rights activists and Vietnam War dissidents in an attempt to fray and often
break apart family and friendship ties.”65 This revelation, on top of the realization that the
Bureau had maintained files on a million US citizens without court approval and had
investigated nearly half that number, only added fuel to the Church Committee fire.66
The last straw for many Americans was the result of the Committee’s
investigation into the National Security Agency (NSA). The NSA’s involvement in a
program codenamed SHAMROCK, which raised questions of constitutionality when
Committee lawyers discovered that telegram companies had been providing overseas
transmissions to the NSA, including the communications of American citizens to foreign
nationals overseas, a historical foreshadowing of the current NSA data collection
62
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controversy.67 The program revealed had existed during the presidency of Harry Truman
in 1952 as a leftover from the Second World War, though it was uncertain whether any
president or attorney general since had been informed of its existence, much less granted
permission for it to continue.68 While the NSA denied that its analysts had read American
messages, the fact that private companies had contributed to such violations of
constitutional privacy was solely alarming.69
SHAMROCK was not the only questionable program unearthed by the Church
Committee. “Under Operation MINARET, begun in the late 1960s, the agency compiled
a watch list of dissenters, deserters, and anyone participating in civil disturbances,
including notable individuals like Joan Baez, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and Jane
Fonda, which it distributed to the army and other government agencies.”70 As
unconstitutional programs began to pile up, the Church Committee’s report grew in
significance as well as potential impact for both the Intelligence Community and
Congress.71
The committee’s report, when it was finally published, prompted major changes
to the Intelligence Community, primarily in the area of executive approval, while
affirming its importance to national security and acknowledging the necessity of
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operational covert action capacity.72 “The committee insisted on greater Congressional
and policymaker oversight of intelligence…”73 This was accomplished through the
establishment of the intelligence oversight committees in both houses of Congress; the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence was established in 1976 as a direct result of the
Church committee’s report.74 Johnson explains, “The Senate put into place a potentially
effective standing committee, equipped with a large and experienced professional staff,
devoted to monitoring the secret agencies day by day and reviewing their programs and
budgets with a fine-tooth comb.”75 The House followed suit with its own intelligence
committee.76 No longer would the CIA or the NSA have free rein to enact any
surveillance or covert action operations against American citizens or without prior
approval, at minimum, of the attorney general.77 Also, no longer would the president
have full and total control over the actions of the Intelligence Community,78 as the
Church Committee’s research proved that, despite Church’s elephant metaphor, many of
the CIA’s questionable actions had been presidentially approved.79
Another direct result of the Church Committee’s investigation and eventual report
was the creation of legislation dictating the requirement of judicial approval for
Central Intelligence Agency, “A Look Back… The Church Committee Meets,” www.cia.gov,
2011, accessed April 13, 2018, https://search-proquest-com.ezproxy.liberty.edu/docview/1679073735?pqorigsite=summon&accountid=12085.
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surveillance and intelligence collection regarding particularly signals intelligence
(SIGINT).80 Walker writes, “The eventual FISA law was a compromise that for the first
time granted the federal government explicit wiretap authority in national security cases
but subjected it to procedural controls.”81 This authority and control eventually emerged
from the legislative process in the form of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978.82
As a result of the Church Committee’s inquiry, “an Act to authorize electronic
surveillance to obtain foreign intelligence information”83 or the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA) was introduced to Congress in 1977.84 FISA fundamentally
changed the way intelligence agencies operated. The legislation marked the beginning of
a new perspective on civil liberties and intelligence collection in the name of national
security.85 Walker claims, “The FISA law, the War Powers Act, and the new
congressional intelligence committees were the monuments of the post-Watergate era
efforts to subject national security activities to the rule of law.”86 FISA reigned in both
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the operational surveillance capabilities of the Intelligence Community87 and the
authority of the president to arbitrarily order electronic surveillance.88
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, as passed, included provisions
regulating a myriad of electronic surveillance activities conducted by the Intelligence
Community towards foreign nationals within the continental United States.89 The act
made any unauthorized surveillance by a law enforcement or intelligence officer illegal,
as well as establishing precedent for the legality and use of any intelligence collected
during such surveillance in criminal proceedings.90 It “permit[ed] the President, acting
through the Attorney General, to authorize electronic surveillances for foreign
intelligence purposes without a court order in certain circumstances.”91 However, the
attorney general was required to ascertain that surveillance methods conformed to
established requirements before authorization, and to inform the Senate and House
Intelligence Committees of these methods 30 days in advance of their application.92 He or
she is also required to report to the Administrative Office of the United States Courts
annually on the number of requests submitted and whether those requests were authorized
or denied, as well as reporting to Congress and its respective Intelligence Committees,
which were in turn required to report once every five years to the full House and
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Senate.93 Finally, the Act allowed the President to authorize 15 days of surveillance on a
foreign target without authorization of the Court in a time of war.94
The Attorney General’s responsibility increased significantly in regards to
intelligence collection under FISA. He or she was to provide a copy of the authorization
for electronic surveillance to the appropriate court before the action is undertaken.95 The
Attorney General also had the power to authorize electronic surveillance in an emergency
scenario without waiting for approval from a FISA judge, given that the judge was
notified of the action and the approval requested within 24 hours.96 This emergency
authority could last only for 24 hours, until the necessary intelligence was gathered, or
until the appropriate judge approved the surveillance request.97
The passage of FISA had immediate and drastic effects on the Intelligence
Community, most directly the CIA, FBI, and NSA. It increased the oversight both of the
legislature, through . the recently established House and Senate Intelligence
Committees,98 and the judiciary, through the establishment of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court.99 It also shifted power to authorize electronic surveillance away from
the direct control of the sitting US President,100 a practice which had historically proved
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detrimental to the Intelligence Community itself and to overall national security and the
protection of civil liberties.101
First, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act protected the Intelligence
Community from the arbitrary and often unconstitutional requests of US presidents. FISA
was designed to “protect Americans from ‘the unchecked power of the President to
engage in foreign intelligence electronic surveillances,’ a major accomplishment
considering that ‘the personal attitudes of executive-branch officials remain the only
governing standard for such operations.’”102 The powerful president could bend the
Intelligence Community to his will, forcing them to condone and conduct
unconstitutional actions against American citizens, but the intelligence agencies and their
leaders and officers had no recourse.103 FISA neutralized these problems by transferring
the authorization power for intelligence actions from the executive branch to the
legislative through the establishment of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees.104
The passage of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act did more than protect
the Intelligence Community from the whims of any particular US president; it also served
to protect the Intelligence Community from itself.105 While certain of the unconstitutional
programs revealed by the Church Committee were initiated or advocated by the
President, the Intelligence Community had instigated several unconstitutional programs

101

Scott, Reining in the State, 162; Graves, “Reform in the IC,” 152-158.

102

Scott, Reining in the State, 162.

103

Ibid., 162, 165-166.

104

Walker, Presidents and Civil Liberties, 338-339.

105

Graves, “Reform in the IC: Nixon’s Huston Plan,” 152-158.

24
on its own volition, including the Huston Plan.106 Graves writes, “When Nixon had
revoked his authorization of the [Huston] plan five days after authorizing it, the agencies
expressed their disappointment and quietly went back to doing everything the Huston
Plan had authorized to them, without presidential direction or approval.”107 The
willingness of intelligences agencies to compromise the freedoms they had sworn to
protect in order to accomplish their mission was troubling,108 and the programs brought to
light by the congressional investigations soon made it clear that the Intelligence
Community required an outside control mechanism to rein in its own self-destructive
tendency to violate civil liberties in the name of national security.109 FISA provided the
oversight to curb Intelligence Community leeway by requiring approval before electronic
surveillance requests were authorized.110 Walker writes, “What is unknown, of course is
the extent to which the mere existence of the FISA process deterred the government from
seeking many dubious requests or forced it to do more investigation to provide a
justifiable request.”111 While as a counterfactual the true impact of the FISA court and its
requirements on the Intelligence Community cannot be calculated, “Robert M. Gates, a
career intelligence officer and DCI under the first President Bush….[stated that]‘[S]ome
awfully crazy schemes might well have been approved had everyone present not known
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and expected hard questions, debate, and criticism from the Hill…’”112 either from the
congressional Intelligence Committees that had been co-products of the Church
Committee alongside FISA or from the judges of the FISA court. The fact remains that
FISA has done much to ensure that the Intelligence Community minds the delicate
balance between constitutional freedoms and national security, primarily by consistently
reminding intelligence agencies of the necessity of conforming to congressionally-set
expectations.113
Finally, FISA served to protect the Intelligence Community from accusations of
impropriety and unconstitutionality from the media and the American public. The
continuous saga of intelligence revelations in the national media throughout the Church
Committee investigations had served to undermine the image and credibility of the
Intelligence Community in the eyes of the American public.114
Scott summarizes, “After years of disclosures of extralegal activities by
intelligence agencies, which at the least violated certain constitutional, if not legal rights,
the American public was in no mood to trust its leaders.”115 The imposition of controls
and oversight on the Intelligence Community served to reassure the public that the
intelligence agencies were indeed working on their behalf, striving to protect them from
threats to national security, not constituting a threat to their liberties.116 The restrictions
imposed by FISA and the necessity of authorization from the FISA court discouraged the
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belief that the Intelligence Community was, in Senator Church’s words, “a rogue
elephant,”117 free to undertake any form of intelligence collection, without any attempt at
oversight or concern for civil freedoms.118
Despite FISA’s success at reigning in overreach on the part of the Executive
Branch and the Intelligence Community, it still suffered its share of failures and
controversy. Walker writes, “Although a historic step toward controlling national security
intelligence gathering, FISA proved to be as flawed as its critics feared.”119 One of the
most decried aspects of FISA was the method in which the FISA court conducted itself,
particularly its lack of restraint upon the Intelligence Community. Walker expounds,
“The FISA court was exceedingly compliant and granted virtually all government
requests for warrants. Between 1978 and 2004, it rejected a grand total of 5 requests
while granting 18,761. And perhaps four of those rejected were later granted after being
modified to satisfy the court.”120
FISA critics also emphasized the secrecy of both the electronic surveillance
allowed by FISA and the FISA Court itself.121 Rule writes, “The FISA court would
deliberate in secret, so that targets of surveillance would not be aware of the fact unless
ultimately prosecuted. Nor…would the public have the opportunity to evaluate
appropriateness of the permissions that it granted…”122 Thus FISA fell prey to the
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paradox that often afflicts national security programs: the challenge of maintaining an
aura of transparency and accountability to oversight that will satiate the American public
while maintaining the upmost secrecy possible. The establishment of the House and
Senate Select Committees on Intelligence served to allay this dilemma as much as
possible by providing an avenue for accountability of the intelligence services that had
clearance to receive and understand classified information.123
While FISA remains the law of the land in regards to restrictions on electronic
and other methods of surveillance, the legislation has undergone multiple alterations
since its passage. FISA was first amended in 1994 to widen its application from only
electronic surveillance to physical searches.124 Congress authorized the expansion of
FISA provisions to extend to searches of physical property, arguing that these searches
should be included under the jurisdiction of the entire FISA Court as opposed to solely
that of the Attorney General.125 Smaller changes also occurred in the following years, as
in 2000, when Congress expanded FISA’s definition of a foreign agent to workers of
foreign governments who either use or obtain a false identification, or in 2001, when
legislation clarified which sectors of federal investigators could utilize FISA
procedures.126
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However, a major change was wrought to FISA courts and legislation after the
tragedy of September 11, 2001.127 Bamford writes, “For years, under [NSA Director
Michael Hayden’s] leadership, the agency had deliberately taken an overly cautious
approach to eavesdropping and, possibly as a result, contributed to the intelligence
failures that led to the attacks. Now he had a different priority.”128 This change of
direction was spearheaded by then-Vice President Dick Cheney.129 Bamford writes, “He
also had serious disagreements with even the existence of FISA, an impediment on
presidential power that he believed ‘served to erode the authority I think the president
needs to be effective, especially in a national security area.’”130 The problem of
maintaining homeland security once again brought to the forefront of national discussion
by a failure to do so on behalf of the world’s premier intelligence agencies, and the White
House began to push an expansion of FISA protocol and procedures.131
Bamford also points out one of the problems with FISA rising from 9/11:
“‘…Under existing laws like FISA, you have to have the name of somebody, have to
already suspect that someone’s a terrorist before you can get a warrant…”132 Intelligence
agencies, particularly the NSA in regards to signals intelligence (SIGINT) or cyber
intelligence (CYBER), could identify the locations of individuals involved in al-Qaeda,
but could not request warrants to tap communications because they could not identify the
127
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individuals to complete a FISA warrant.133 The congressional effort to correct this lack of
surveillance authority to reach those responsible for the national tragedy resulted in the
USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.
The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, or the USA PATRIOT Act,134
expanded the provisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act in several areas.
First, it allowed for the sharing of collected intelligence on foreign targets between
intelligence agencies and with law enforcement,135 The PATRIOT Act expanded FISA
procedures to account for this flaw, primarily through authorizing interagency
communication and the sharing of intelligence gained through electronic surveillance.136
This legislation also upheld FISA as the determining standard for electronic
surveillance procedures, as well as increasing the number of judges presiding over the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court from seven, as the original bill had indicated, to
eleven.137 The law also adjusted FISA warrant requirements. Rule writes, “Instead of
allowing secret monitoring of communications only for investigations declared to have
obtaining foreign intelligence information as their ‘primary purpose,’ Patriot Act
language permits such investigations where such intelligence was a ‘significant
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purpose.’”138 Finally, the expansion of the time period of surveillance for foreign targets
was one of the law’s most crucial amendments to the original FISA protocols.139
Aside from critiques against the permissibility of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court, the actual FISA legislation accomplished much of what it was
designed to do. However, that did not stop future presidents from ignoring it outright
when necessary. One of the largest controversies surrounding FISA legislation occurred
under the Bush Administration in 2005.140 Walker writes, “FISA exploded into a major
controversy under President George W. Bush when it was revealed that he authorized
secret wiretaps evading the law altogether. That controversy was a sobering commentary
on the limits of not just FISA but all of the post-Watergate national security reforms.”141
The subsequent investigation revealed that the Bush administration had tapped the NSA
to conduct illegal wiretaps on American citizens in the immediate aftermath of the
September 11, 2001 attacks on World Trade Center and the Pentagon.142 Exposure of the
program resulted when an employee of one of the involved communications corporations
had discovered the NSA’s use of equipment within the facility where he worked, and
soon the nation was shocked to discover that the NSA had, against the congressional
limitations of FISA, illegally wiretapped American citizens.143
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The problem for the Bush Administration, particularly Vice President Dick
Cheney and attorney David Addington, began when FISA started turning down his
administration’s requests for warrants in the wake of 9/11.144 Bamford writes, “Judges on
the court kicked back more wiretap requests from the Bush administration than from the
four previous administrations combined.”145 Cheney and others in the administration also
had a deep-seated resentment for the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act as detracting
from presidential authority and thus jeopardizing national security.146 Frustrated at their
failure to gain the court’s approval for the measures they felt were necessary to deter
another terrorist attack and to hunt down those responsible for the devastation,147 “after
9/11 they [Cheney and Addington]…dealt with FISA the way they dealt with other laws
they didn’t like: they blew through them in secret.”148 With Attorney General John
Ashcroft, underling John C. Yoo, and NSA Director Michael Hayden, Cheney and
Addington began looking for a way to avoid what they viewed as the court’s impediment
of necessary homeland security strategies.149 This circumvention of the FISA
requirements and the FISA court resulted in the development of a program that, through
cooperation with companies, allowed the NSA to spy on incoming and outgoing
messages in the form of both phone calls and emails.150
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While NSA Director Hayden lacked Cheney’s derision for the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act, he “complained that it was designed for an earlier period of
time,”151 and this belief impacted his actions in regard to the NSA’s wiretap program,
which was designed to bypass “cumbersome and time-consuming”152 FISA procedures.
As a result, Hayden found himself briefing the congressional intelligence committees on
a related program that provided the springboard for the wiretaps.153 Then, “just days after
the briefing, on October 4, Hayden received authorization to bypass the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court and begin eavesdropping on international
communications to and from Americans without a warrant.”154 The NSA had managed to
completely nullify FISA restrictions, and the Intelligence Community once again began
to closely reflect Senator Church’s “rogue elephant on a rampage.”155
How had a premier US intelligence agency and a sitting US President managed to
completely circumvent the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, despite its expansions
under the recently passed USA PATRIOT Act? FISA, despite the alterations of the
PATRIOT Act, stood squarely in the path of such a program, as did its court.156 Neither
was capable of preventing the executive decision to merely ignore the constitutional
requirements for electronic surveillance in the name of national security.157 In fact,
“except for the presiding judge, Royce Lamberth, the FISA Court was also kept in the
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dark about the NSA’s warrantless program.”158 Lamberth was called into a meeting with
Ashcroft, Yoo, and Hayden regarding the program, but rather than being consulted on the
legality of such a program, he was informed that the “presidential decision”159 to enact
the program had already been made. Lamberth had no alternative but to go along with the
program; the safeguards imposed by FISA had been steamrolled in the name of national
security.160 He would later critique the program publicly, warning, “‘We have to
understand you can fight the war [on terrorism] and lose everything if you have no civil
liberties left when you get through fighting the war.’”161
Unfortunately for the NSA, it did not seem to learn its lesson, for 2005 would not
be the last time it was caught in violation of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. As
referenced above, in 2014 the NSA was revealed to be collecting the communications of
US citizens while conducting a data mining program targeted towards foreign nationals
after a contractor leaked classified FISA information pulled from NSA computers.162
Once again, despite its best efforts at congressional and judicial oversight, the
Intelligence Community was found on the wrong side of the fine line separating actions
that ensure national security and those that violate the freedoms of the people it protects.
The story that one of America’s premier intelligence agencies, the NSA, was
running a top-secret data collection and retention program that had inadvertently gathered
information on American citizens shocked the public when it was leaked by NSA
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contractor Edward Snowden.163 Washington Post reporter Bart Gellman published an
article on the NSA’s data collection programs in 2014, detailing the NSA’s activities in
programs such as PRISM and Upstream.164 Gellman explained the accidental collection
of data of American citizens including medical records, transcripts, and personal
photographs as an unintended side effect of an attempt to target foreign actors who posed
potential threats to national security.165 The surveillance of Americans under these
programs raised concerns about potential violations of the rights guaranteed to American
citizens in the Bill of Rights.
The primary problems arose in the retention of the data and the amount of data
collected relating to citizens versus the amount collected on the actual intended target.166
The NSA kept much of the collected information, regardless of its relevance to current
targets or ongoing operations, unwilling to let any potential intelligence slip through the
cracks.167 This practice raised concerns given Gellman’s analysis that 9 out of 10 pieces
of data were unrelated to foreign targets.168
While many people were quick to condemn the NSA’s actions, specifically in
retaining the personal information of American citizens, American Enterprise Institute’s
Gary Schmitt makes a valid observation that increased cyber surveillance for the sake of
national security was “demanded from the intelligence community in the wake of 9/11 in
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order to help to preempt similar attacks.”169 Reeling from the events of September 11,
2001 that left thousands of Americans dead, the American public began pressuring law
enforcement and intelligence communities to step up their counterterrorism activities and
forces.170 As a result, Congress swiftly passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004, which, among other things, created the position of Director of
National Intelligence (DNI) and reformed the process by which intelligence agencies
share intelligence. Congress later enacted the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, which
allowed the targeting of foreign actors outside the continental US under certain strict
limitations, including the provisions of the Fourth Amendment, and which established the
responsibility of the Attorney General and the Intelligence Community in overseeing
counterterrorism activity under FISA.171
In discussions of privacy violations, the First and Fourth Amendment are often
cited.172 The First Amendment guarantees the freedoms of speech, press, religion,
petition, and assembly.173 Some would argue that programs such as the NSA’s data
collection of American citizens violate their freedoms of speech and press by cataloguing
their online discussions, or even the right to assemble, given that some data was collected
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in online chat rooms, even of those who did not comment but were merely present.174 The
Fourth Amendment states that, “The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches ands seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation…”175
Several problems arise in any attempt to define the constitutionality of programs
related to data collection on any form of cyber platform. According to Paul Rosenzweig,
a Heritage Foundation Fellow, “…information you disclose to a third party is not
protected by the Fourth Amendment. In the context of data privacy, that means that there
is no constitutional protection against the collection and aggregation of your cyber data
(credit card purchase and the like) for purposes of data analysis…”176 His comment on
third party information is a reference to the Supreme Court case Smith v. Maryland,
where “the Court held that… when we reveal private information to a third party, we lose
privacy rights over it.”177 This case determined that data freely given to an outside source
is no longer under Fourth Amendment protection;178 according to this precedent, the
NSA’s collection program would pass as constitutional because the information is freely
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shared with outside sources and then collected by the agency from those sources which
are not protected by the Fourth Amendment.
Rosenzweig goes on to explain that a further problem with claiming invasion of
privacy by the NSA is the lack of applicability of current privacy laws to modern data
collection.179 Put simply, privacy protection requirements are so antiquated as to be
useless in defining what is legal or illegal in regards to modern data collection.180 These
laws are collated into a series of criteria known as the Fair Information Principles, which
defined different aspects of privacy and dictated the constitutional limits of government
access into the private lives of its citizens.181 However, many of these requirements are
either inapplicable to data collection via modern Internet sources or fly in the face of the
purpose of data collection in providing information from which analysts can extract
valuable intelligence.182 The ever-changing definitions of privacy, anonymity, and
obscurity, as referenced by Rosenzweig in his testimony, do nothing to assist in clarifying
this argument.183 What, then, is the final analysis of the programs’ constitutionally?
The only true litmus test for a breach of constitutional limitation on federal
government is the Constitution itself, in this case specifically the Bill of Rights. The most
relevant amendment to the NSA’s programs is the Fourth, which defends against the
unqualified search of a person or their belongings, to include material and intellectual
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property.184 It would seem simple that the collection of a person’s online postings or
messages by a federal agency would be a violation of this constitutional protection if not
for the precedent set by the Supreme Court in Smith v. Maryland.185 It is the
responsibility of the Court to apply the Constitution and its amendments faithfully within
a modern context that is not specifically spelled out in the original documents themselves.
In the case of Smith, the Court ruled that information voluntarily surrendered to a third
party was not protected under the Fourth Amendment, because the owner of that
intellectual property had willingly released it to an actor outside of him or herself.186
What happened to the information afterwards was not a matter of constitutionality, and it
is under the cover of this third-party precedent that the NSA’s programs fall. Because the
American Internet users voluntarily turned this information over to either internet
providers, which PRISM targeted,187 or to other individuals via the Internet, they can no
longer claim constitutional protection for that information under the Fourth
Amendment.188 Thus, it is not a constitutional violation for the NSA to collect this data
for its own purposes.
The other controversial aspect of the NSA revelations is the retention of this data
by the agency once it determined it to be inconsequential.189 However, as problematic as
this practice may strike some, it is not specifically addressed by the Constitution. In the
184

Essential Liberty Project, The Patriot’s Essential Liberty Pocket Guide, 48.

185

Yoo, “The flaw in the Fourth Amendment NSA ruling.”

186

Ibid.

187
Bart Gellman, Julie Tate, and Ashkan Soltani, “In NSA-intercepted data, those not targeted far
outnumber the foreigners who are.”
188

Yoo, “The flaw in the Fourth Amendment NSA ruling.”

189

Ibid.

39
name of national security, this information continues to be collected and archived in the
hope that eventually it may be used as a small piece of the puzzle that will prevent future
attacks or deter potential threats against the United States and all of its citizens.
James Carafano summarized this analysis well when he wrote for the Heritage
Foundation:
It is clear that the NSA has sufficient legal authority to conduct legitimate
counterterrorism surveillance. It cannot be determined, from what is publically
available, whether the NSA faithfully followed the law or whether the
surveillance, even if legal, was appropriate to the threats being addressed. It is,
however, up to the instruments of ordered liberty to provide us satisfactory
answers.190
While no American citizen would condone even the implication that his or her rights
were being infringed upon by federal government, a strong case exists to support the
conclusion that the NSA’s actions were and are constitutional, enacted in the hopes of
protecting American citizens from a catastrophic national security disaster on par with the
event that triggered the genesis of these programs.
However, an important facet of this discussion is the relevance of the original
context of these programs. The months and years following the unprecedented terror
attacks of September 11, 2001, left the nation in a state of panic, confusion, and fear.
Measures needed to be taken both to assuage the fears of the public and to deter other
attacks in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, while US national security and military forces
were trying to regain their footing and determine responsibility.191 Bamford writes, “Civil
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liberties were out, Fortress America was in.”192 Americans were more willing to condone
actions with potential privacy violations in the name of national defense in the wake of
such a shocking attack than they were more than a decade removed from the horrors of
September 11:
[Yoo] noted that while such unprecedented and intrusive actions might be rejected
on constitutional grounds during normal times, they are now justified as a result
of the 9/11 attacks. During such times, he said, ‘the government may be justified
in taking measures which in less troubled conditions could be seen as
infringements of individual liberties.’193
Situational context is not ultimately a factor in determining constitutionality, but it
does speak to the creation and implementation of the NSA’s data programs and the
intention behind them.
Implications for the US Intelligence Community
While the NSA’s data collection program may pass the test of constitutionality,
this does not eliminate the damage done by the initial revelation to the reputation of the
Intelligence Community, already tragically wounded by the events that brought about the
formation of Church Committee and subsequently the Intelligence Committees and
spurred by the FISA revelations of 2005. The circumstances surrounding the birth of the
United States, the country’s founding documents, and nearly every significant event that
has occurred in US history reflect this sentiment: the American people always have and
always will place the value of personal civil freedom above any other concern, including
the all-important preservation of national security. Intelligence agencies must understand
and share this perspective if they are to remain effective and relevant in the current
political environment. Failure to do so on the part of the Federalist Party in 1798 and the
192
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Intelligence Community in the 1970s resulted in the death of the party after the 1800
election and a loss of faith in and increased oversight of the Community in 1970s. Walker
writes that Church’s “[rogue elephant] metaphor caught the popular imagination and still
defines the CIA for many people.”194 The US Intelligence Community has, through its
own actions, lost the trust of the American people, resulting in an attitude of skepticism at
best and calls for its disestablishment at worst.
If Intelligence Community agencies are to continue in their desire to protect the
United States and its citizens, they must take drastic and immediate steps both to remedy
its historic problems with civil liberties violations and repair its image in the eyes of
those it strives to protect. However, this deference to civil liberty can be difficult for the
US Intelligence Community, an organization primarily dedicated to the defense of
national security. In this, as in all other sectors of the debate, perspective is key. The
Intelligence Community is responsible not only for the protection of the people of the
United States but also for the protections of the rights of those people. With this in mind,
it is imperative that the agencies of the Intelligence Community consider the perspective
of American citizens in the accomplishment of their goals; both the security of the people
of the United States but the security of their rights must be kept in mind. This trend has
recently become more apparent in the publications of Intelligence Community agencies.
The CIA’s official website declares its mission to “preempt threats and further US
security objectives,”195 while simultaneously addressing concerns over civil liberties:
“We uphold the highest standards of lawful conduct… We maintain the Nation’s trust
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through accountability and oversight.”196 The NSA also boasts its commitment to
“respect for the law”197 and “accountability.”198 The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
dedicates an entire internal organization to such concerns; the Office of Privacy and Civil
Liberties advocates the protection of rights, with the reservation of “consistent with
operational requirements.”199
Such conditions are entirely the concern. As demonstrated above, Intelligence
Community agencies tend to view civil liberty considerations as a restriction on their
ability to accomplish their goals without realizing that the protection of rights is their
primary goal as one of the most central aspects of protecting American citizens.200 If the
Intelligence Community is earnest in its desire to protect the United States, its people,
and their rights, several immediate steps must be taken to correct the current image of the
Community and to craft a more constitutionally consistent vision moving forward.
First, the Intelligence Community must work tirelessly to improve the current
perception of itself that resulted from the exposures of the Church Committee and other
recent revelations. If the American people cannot trust the Intelligence Community with
the defense of their constitutional rights, they will be hard-pressed to trust it with their
lives and livelihoods; therefore, the Intelligence Community must go out of its way to
assuage concerns over civil liberties in order to fulfill its purpose. Intelligence agencies
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can accomplish this by immediately ceasing any programs analogous to PRISM,
SHAMROCK, or anything remotely resembling a potential question of constitutionality.
Compliance with oversight structures implemented following the Church Committee
Report, including the congressional Intelligence Committees, is strictly necessary.
However, merely defensive solutions are not enough to restore American trust in
the Intelligence Community to a satisfactory point of operation for its agencies. Proactive
measures must be also be undertaken. The primary problem of the Intelligence
Community arises from a lack of information. Many Americans view intelligence
agencies with suspicion simply because they do not understand the practices and
purposes of the Intelligence Community, and given the nature of intelligence, this is to a
certain extent irremediable. However, intelligence agencies need to strive for as great a
measure of transparency as is practical, or at the very least an atmosphere of such. While
it is often not possible to prove that such practices as those revealed by the Church
Committee no longer occur, the attitude of Intelligence Community leaders can attempt
to communicate what their actions feasibly cannot.
A measure of transparency was initiated with the creation of the position of
Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to serve as the public face of the Intelligence
Community and to represent the IC before Congress and before the American people.
One aspect of this is the DNI’s annual Worldwide Threat Assessment, a “State of the
Union” of the Intelligence Community listing and elaborating upon the Intelligence
Community’s primary foci for the year.201 The 2018 Threat Assessment, presented to the
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Senate Armed Services Committee202 by current Director of National Intelligence Dan
Coates, summarized the key threats facing the United States first by topic and then by
geographic location.203 Such efforts, as well as testimony before Congress by members of
the Intelligence Community, serve to demonstrate willingness on the part of the
Intelligence Community to engage with the American people and go far in its attempt to
demonstrate the depth of its commitment to the protection of themselves and their
freedoms.
Conclusion
As demonstrated above, the line of demarcation between the protected freedoms
guaranteed to American citizens and the ceded territory in which the US Intelligence
Community can conduct its national security activities has been historically inconsistent,
battered in each direction by continual tides of crises both of security and of dramatic
overreach on the part of the federal government. The primary question the Intelligence
Community faces today does not deal with history but with current events and public
opinion. Where does the line fall in the present and immediate future?
The strong negative reaction from the public and correspondingly from the
legislature surrounding recent incidents such as Gellman’s exposure of PRISM, as well as
the considerable distance from a significant national security event, indicate that
America’s citizens are highly unlikely to accept government encroachment into personal
freedoms in the current political environment, and the Intelligence Community needs to
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adjust its goals and practices accordingly. The House and Senate Intelligence
Committees, designed in the aftermath of the Church Committee to provide additional
oversight for the Intelligence Community, must be mindful both of the current challenges
faced by intelligence agencies and of their intentions to protect American citizens, not
endanger them through a reduction of their rights. A spirit of cooperation with oversight
avenues as well as a degree of transparency are critical, though those responsible for
intelligence supervision must understand the difficulty of transparency due to the nature
of intelligence activities.
This analysis returns finally to the question of the primacy of liberty. Given the
historic foundations of the concept of civil freedoms so deeply rooted in America’s
origins, the first and most basic state of American liberty is its investiture in the hands
and hearts of the American people.204 If a baseline is to be established, the status quo
must be the reservation of all rights and freedoms to US citizens, granted temporarily and
partially to the federal government in order to obtain guarantees or protections not
otherwise available.205 In the words of Abraham Lincoln, “The legitimate object of
government, is to do for a community of people, whatever they need to have done, but
can not do, at all, or can not, so well do, for themselves—in their separate, and individual
capacities. In all that the people can individually do as well for themselves, government
ought not to interfere.”206
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This parameter demonstrates the essential spirit exemplified in the creation of the
federal government; freedom flows from the American people to the American
government to accomplish effects otherwise impossible, an allowance that may at any
time be rescinded.207 While the aims of the US Intelligence Community are easily
subsumed in the category of goals not achievable by individual citizens and therefore the
rightful and constitutional jurisdiction of governmental authority,208 the nature of this
transmission should shape the attitude and viewpoint of Intelligence Community
agencies. Not only their respective abilities but also their responsibilities are not
inherently derived from their own goals and institutions but a delegation of power from
those in whom it resides, namely American citizens.209 As such, agencies have a
responsibility not solely to respect the rights of Americans as their beneficiaries but as
their benefactors,210 and intelligence agencies that have sworn to protect US citizens must
incorporate this belief into their own perspectives of defense of freedoms as inherently
linked to defense of the country and its people. While tensions between civil liberty and
national security continue to exist in the present and future for both the Intelligence
Community and the American people, President Barack Obama summarized best the only
reliable and reasonable option for the resolution of this debate:
The men and women of our intelligence community work every single day to
keep us safe because they love our country and believe in our values. They’re
patriots. And I believe that those who have lawfully raised their voices on behalf
of privacy and civil liberties are also patriots who love our country and want it to
live up to our highest ideals. So this is how we’re going to resolve our differences
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in the United States—through vigorous public debate, guided by our Constitution,
with reverence for our history as a nation of laws, and with respect for the facts.211
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